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Article 4

MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN SUITS RELATING
TO GEOPHYSICAL OPERATIONS
When the late Walace Hawkins, then General Counsel of
the Magnolia Petroleum Company, addressed the Gregg
County (Texas) Bar Association on December 10, 1949, he
discussed the geophysical trespasser and the negligent geophysical explorer.' He deplored the "famine of professional
literature on the legal aspects of geophysical exploration,"
and hoped that his remarks might provoke much-needed professional consideration on the subject.2
This article was written in keeping with that hope, and is
but a very modest and limited attempt to review the decisions
extant when Mr. Hawkins spoke and to discuss those pertinent cases which have been adjudicated since that time.
Geophysical exploration, a highly technical science, is
used to ascertain the location of subsurface structure and
mineral deposits by surface measurements of physical qualities. It should be noted that no geophysical method itself
locates oil, but each does determine geological structure, i.e.,
anticlines, salt domes and faults, which are indicia of oil
possibilities. Specifically the main methods employed to
determine underground structure are termed: (1) Gravity,
(2) Magnetic, (3) Seismic, and (4) Electrical. Any of these
methods might necessitate the use of, and/or injury to land
with a resultant claim for compensation.
Generally, there are four grounds on which damages are
sought against a geophysical operator, namely: (1) Trespass
-

bad faith; (2) Trespass -

good faith; (3) Negligence;

and (4) Lease Interpretation. However, any study of damages must be closely related to value. Consequently, this
analytical survey will emphasize the various criteria for
1 Hawkins, The Geophysical Trespasser and Negligent Geophysical Explorer,
29 TFms L. Rrv. 310 (1951).
2 Id. at 318.
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determining value, and the application of these standards to
the various situations.
Other than the standard terms employed in damage claims,
e.g., nominal, punitive, exemplary or compensatory, there
are several standards for value (a term which will be, for all
practical purposes in this discussion, synonymous with the
term "damage"). Basically, these are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Actual "shot hole" value.
Actual surface damage.
Shooting value (i.e., exploration permit price).
Destruction of market value of lease by wrongful
exploration and/or dissemination of such information.
(e) Value reaped by wrongdoer.
(f) In negligence cases, the actual damage suffered by
plaintiff.
As one approach to this problem let us analyze the existing
decisions to determine the prevailing measure of value and
the reasons therefor. For the purposes of continuity, we will
review the cases chronologically within the framework of the
four types of suits set out above.
Trespass-

Bad Faith

Thomas v. Texas Co.,3 a 1928 Texas decision, is the forerunner of cases dealing with geophysical exploration. Thomas
had sought punitive and loss of lease damages for the trespass
by the Texas Company. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant entered the property without permission, explored, found
negative results and then published this information. He
further alleged destruction of the market value of his land,
which was about $400.00 per acre prior to the defendant's
tortious act, but worthless after the tests and the dissemination of the information. Nevertheless, Thomas was awarded
3

12 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
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only nominal damages since he failed to offer any evidence
that the trespass was the proximate cause of the loss of the
market value of the leasehold rights in the land; nor was
proof offered of the dissemination of the information. This
is a case of a bare recovery of nominal damages, in spite of the
defendant having had the benefit of exploration and security
of investment in the area. Moreover, it is common knowledge
that the defendant's nominal damages payment would have
been an infinitesimal part of the costs, had the Texas Company been required to drill. Further, since court costs and
nominal damages on the one hand, are neglible as compared
with drilling costs on the other, what deterrent is there to a
possible trespasser; and what remedy for actual recompense
is afforded the plaintiff?
Admittedly it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain a
speculative loss and the courts are excusably hesitant in engaging in arithmetic conjecture in order to reach a reasonable
valuation. This first case must simply be listed as one in
which only nominal damages were granted for a bad faith
trespass. Whether such recovery was for shot hole damages
or a mere mechanical recovery for the trespass per se is not
indicated in the opinion.
Le Bleu v. Vacuum Oil Co.,4 decided in 1931, is the earliest
Louisiana opinion involving geophysical exploration. Exemplary damages were sought by the plaintiff. The defendant
had unlawfully entered the plaintiff's fenced-in property,
built a hut, installed a torsion balance for a three to four hour
experiment and then left the hut standing for three days.
The evidence showed that the information sought by the
torsion balance related to land some two miles from the
plaintiff's property. On the basis of this evidence, the plaintiff's claim for damages in the amount of $500.00 for lease
depreciation was denied. Instead, he was awarded $100.00
for a "quasi offense" - in reality a nominal recovery for a
4

15 La. App. 689, 132 So. 233 (1931).
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wrongful invasion. This was the second case where a bad
faith trespasser was assessed a small damage award for a
blatant wrong.
A bad faith trespass was again in issue in Texas in 1931
before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shell Petroleum
Corp. v. Moore.5 A trespass had been committed on Louisiana
land but the plaintiff sought recovery in Texas. On this
basis the circuit court held that the action was not maintainable. However, in dictum, the court stated that the landowner's exclusive possession was the same after the trespass
as before and there was no ground for an assertion of conversion. Stating only that bare trespass had been committed,
the court did not venture to say what type of recovery in
damages would be available, had the plaintiff not erred
procedurally.
In 1934, the Fifth Circuit was again called upon to adjudicate a bad faith geophysical trespass case arising in Louisiana
in Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Scully.6 The plaintiff sought to

recover the value of the exploration privilege, at $5.00 per
acre, plus the cost of refilling the holes (actual surface damage). He did not claim the loss of the leasing value. In fact,
the plaintiff had benefited by the information obtained by
the explorer. The defendant had offered to lease from the
plaintiff, but what the plaintiff wanted, in the main, was
recovery akin to the price paid locally for a "selection lease"
(i.e., a lease giving grantee, for a small down payment, the
right for a limited time to explore premises with an option
to lease at an agreed price such portion of lease as he, the
grantee, might select). There was no actual damage to the
plaintiff beyond the actual trespass, and defendant had exercised only the privilege of exploration. An integral part of the
"selection lease", an option, was not acquired by the defendant.
5 46 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1931).
6 71 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934).
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The court instructed the lower court to fix the value of the
privilege assumed by the defendant. Therefore, it must be
noted, the defendant was required to compensate for the
wrongful appropriation of the right to explore, apart from
liability arising out of his wrongful acts of actually damaging
the land in question."
One writer presents the interesting observation that this
opinion assures damages which are in substance being
measured by the reasonable value of the benefit accruing to
the defendant, rather than the "loss" to the landowner.' Mr.
Hawkins decried such a basis in his 1949 talk.' In reality, the
decision did provide a new concept, not in tort based on the
plaintiff's loss as the measure, but instead geared to the value
of the benefit obtained by the defendant. This same idea has
been expressed as a "minus quality" on the part of the plaintiff (his temporary loss of the exclusive use of his land) and
the "plus quality" falling to the defendant (the benefit of
information received and the exercise of a privilege).'
At least one other writer believes the damages assessed
should be based on the value reaped by the wrongdoer. However, one qualification is made: award is to be granted only
when the value of the information acquired by the defendant
exceeds the cost of the market price of a permit in the area,
thus barring any benefit to the defendant through the commission of a tort." It is submitted that the aforementioned
concept is just in the end sought, but the difficult question is
posed: What means or standards of measurement may be
employed to secure such an equitable end?
Ten years later the same court was called upon in another
Louisiana case, Iberville Land Co. v. Amerada Petroleum
Corp." This case illustrated the area of substantive law in
7 Note, 48 HARv. L. REV. 485, 487 (1935).
8 HAWKInS, supra note 1, at 317.
9 41 W. VA. L. Q. 89, 90 (1934).
10 Comment, 4 LA. L. REv. 309 (1942).
11 141 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1944).
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which the greater number of Louisiana geophysical decisions
lie, namely tort, not quasi-contract.' The plaintiff sought to
recover a sum of money alleged to be the value of the
information the defendant unlawfully obtained through geophysical operations on the plaintiff's property. The complaint
was dismissed upon a plea of the Statute of Limitations, since
the case was determined to be one of tort, not one of contract
and the statute had run out. The dictum here is an excellent
indication of the court's concept of such actions in the jurisdiction of Louisiana.
Layne Louisiana Co. v. Superior Oil Co.'" is another bad
faith trespass action coming from Louisiana, The plaintiff
sued for illegal trespass and geophysical operations on its
land. The defendant admitted the trespass but contended
that the damages were only nominal. The court held that the
complaint was entitled to only compensatory, and not punitive or exemplary damages.
Layne's gate had been broken open, the defendant had
entered and had made a complete geophysical survey of the
property (the plaintiff owned all the mineral rights and also
had a fee simple title to various parts of the land). Four
types of damages were sought by the plaintiff: $5.00 per acre
for the loss of value of the land owned in fee or that under
mineral lease to him; $25.00 per acre for the loss of value
for mineral and royalty purposes on the lands under mineral
lease or owned in fee. The court allowed only the first of the
four claims, upholding a similar decision in the trial court.
Since the right to geophysical exploration is a valuable one,
plaintiff was awarded $5.00 per acre for those acres he owned
in fee. All other claims were considered too uncertain and
their values undeterminable. Further, the court held that the
loss of value for mineral and royalty purposes was not proved,
no evidence having been shown to indicate that defendant's
12

13

Ci. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Scully, supra note 6.
209 La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20 (1946).

MEASURE OF DAMAGES

operations affected the market value. A fortiori, compensatory damages may be recovered for certain and definite
losses of mineral leasing values. Punitive damages were not
awarded here and the effect of the judgment was to give
damages equivalent to the value of similar geophysical rights
on adjoining lands. 4 Would not this be similar to a recovery
for a trespass based on exploration permit costs? It is well to
remember that the instant case clearly states that the right
to explore had a market value apart from the value of the
right to create a leasehold.
An interesting decision interpreting the criminal liability
provisions of a Louisiana statute relating to geophysical tests
was rendered in State v. Evans. 5 The defendant, with the
consent of the Louisiana State Highway Commissioner, had
conducted geophysical operations from public roads crossing
the plaintiff's lands. Under the law, the State had only a mere
right of passage, and the soil in the roadbed belonged to the
plaintiff. Evans was held liable for violation of Act 212 of
1934, which read: "
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation...
to prospect, by ... any mechanical device ...

for oil, gas or

other minerals .. . on the public lands of the state without the
consent of the register of the state land office, or on the public
highways of the state without the consent of the Louisiana
highway commission, or on private property without the consent of the owner....

On appeal the defendant was saved on a technicality; the
indictment charged "private lands" exploration whereas these
roads were public. The statute being penal was strictly con14 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940). Accord, as to the measure of damages is Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So.2d 457 (1948). This case arose from
the same acts of trespass as in the Layne case, the plaintiffs here, however, being
the owners of the mineral rights. The court gave the same amount of damages, $5.00
per acre, for the appropriated exploration privilege. The award was directly related
to the "going price" of exploration rights in the general area.
15 214 La. 472,38 So.2d 140 (1948).

16 La. Acts 1934, No. 212 as quoted in 9 LA. L. Rav. 561 (1949). The present
act, substantially changed in wording, is LA. Rav. STAT. ANNOTATIONS § 30:217

(1950).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

strued, and the defendant's conviction was set aside. One
writer disapproves of this decision, calling attention to Act
283 of 1942, which required the consent of an abutting
owner." The 1942 Act was not mentioned by either party,
or by the court. As the writer notes: "
As it was pointed out by the supreme court on appeal, the
only portion of the 1934 statute not abrogated by subsequent
legislation is the provision making it a misdemeanor to conduct
geophysical surveys on private lands without the consent of the
owner. The defendant did not get the consent of the complainant as required by this statute. He did not receive the consent
of the commissioner of conservation, who under the 1940 act
had the sole authority to grant permission to conduct operations on public roads, and who under the 1942 statute cannot
issue such a permit without the consent of the abutting
property owner. It would appear that within the meaning of
these statutes the defendant might have been properly indicted
for unauthorized exploration of either public or private lands.

This is a convincing argument, indicating the procedure which
should have been followed.
One of Louisiana's most recent contributions to the field
is the case of Franklin v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 9 decided in
1951. The plaintiff sued on the grounds of an unauthorized
entry, also for wrongful dissemination of the information
gained from the illegally conducted tests. Damages for $37,834.45, or $5.00 per acre, had been awarded in the lower
court. Louisiana's Supreme Court recognized the right of
exploration as valuable, but ruled that only compensatory
damages may be awarded and that the evidence did not
support an award of more than $7,500.00.
Exemplary damages were sought by the plaintiff in Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co.,2" an opinion rendered by
a Texas Court in 1948. The plaintiff sought such recovery on
the alleged trespass caused by seismographic vibrations. The
17

18
19
20

Comment, 9 LA. L. REV. 561 (1949).
Id. at 562-3.
218 La. 987, 51 So.2d 600 (1951).
213 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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defendant had been refused the right to "shoot" on this land.
Determined to obtain valuable data the defendant set off
charges alongside plaintiff's tract with receiving points located on the highway; thus none of the shots were directed
through the plaintiff's land. It was alleged that the vibrations
constituted a trespass. At no time was there any actual
physical invasion of the plaintiff's land. The court found
evidence lacking as to any physical damage, any malice, or
trespass. Recovery therefore was not allowed.
Highway usage did not come under judicial surveillance
in this decision, but the facts clearly show that the highway
was the source of defendant's operations. We shall see later
that highway use is a possible subject of litigation. In the
instant case the court cited for corroboration of its decision
the case of Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas & Pacific Coal
& Oil Co.: 21 "If the purpose be lawful, physical trespass
absent, primary use reasonable, and manner of that use duly
careful, consequences are damnum absque...."
This case may illustrate, by analogy, that actions against
aircraft carrying testing apparatus would be fruitless. Despite
the absence of an actual, physical invasion constituting a trespass, it is obvious that informatioll secured from a highway
or from the air is just as useful to the explorer; and if negligible results are obtained and then communicated to the
public, equally as harmful to the landowner.
Could a unique type property interest in the nature of the
right of privacy be developed? Information regarding the
presence of oil, regardless of the source, has a real market
value. The value of the information is one thing and the
value of a person's land another. Impossibility of measuring
damages, even nominal, will continue to retard acceptance of
any scheme to make the property owner whole.
Surveying the above nine cases, six of them from or concerned with Louisiana law and three of Texas origin, one
21

298 S.W. 594 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927).
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cannot escape the conclusion that compensatory damages will
be the criterion in both jurisdictions, despite the fact that
wrongdoers might reap very material benefits from their
tortious acts over and above any actual damage they might
cause.
Trespass -

Good Faith

Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,2 2 decided in 1940,
involved a careless trespass, the plaintiff alleging an unauthorized operation on his land. The defendant had placed four
torsion balance stations on the plaintiff's property and learned from the tests that production of oil was improbable. This
resulted in a considerable loss of the speculative value of the
land, and the owner sued for the actual trespass and the dissemination of ruinous information." Damages specifically
sought were (1) recovery for value of the right to enter and
survey the land (i.e., permit value); and (2) recovery for the
resulting loss incurred by the plaintiff through his inability
to lease his land for oil and gas. On appeal, the lower court's
judgment of $7,500.00 to plaintiff - the value of an exploration permit plus disparagement of mineral quality caused by
the defendant - was affirmed.
Thus, we note here a further development in the Louisiana
courts. The plaintiff was permitted to recover the potential
leasehold value, the court ruling that the exploratory privilege is a valuable property right. As damages are discretionary with the trier of fact in this state, recovery was computed
on the basis of the market value of similiar privileges granted
elsewhere in the locale.
196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940).
As a right not possessed was asserted here by the defendant, by analogy some
of the principles evolved in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1925) might be applied. At least one authority styles this case as one
of "slander of title." 1 THORNTON, OIL & GAS § 215 (Willis ed. Supp. 1948). Any
discussion of the possibility of slander of title is, unfortunately, not within the scope
of this paper.
22
23
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Oklahoma, in a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp,24 first added case law to the problem
in 1943. The plaintiff had employed an agent to conduct
seismographic operations along the public roads of the state.
Neither the plaintiff nor its agent had secured the permission
of abutting landowners to conduct these tests. This suit arose
when the defendant, after obtaining information from the
agent concerning certain of the abutting properties, secured
an oil and gas lease of that property. Plaintiff asked the court
to hold the defendant as a constructive trustee of the lease
for plaintiff's benefit. The defendant moved to dismiss on the
ground that plaintiff had himself approached the equity court
with "dirty hands," since his operations were trespasses on
the owners' properties. The court, however, imposed the
trust, holding that plaintiff had acted in good faith and was
therefore only an innocent trespasser.
It is perplexing to try to ascertain the degree to which a
court will go in order to protect a person against the acquisition of geophysical information obtained without entering
his land. This decision is the earliest recorded which raised
the nicety of determining whether a geophysical operation is
a legitimate use of the public highways. The Oklahoma court
indicated that the plaintiff's use of the highway was not
proper, although that point was not material to the decision
because plaintiff had acted in good faith. As we saw in the
later Kennedy opinion, the courts will not hold such activities
actionable in the absence of bad faith.
Though the concurring justice agreed with the decision he
felt compelled to distinguish the trespass question, saying,
1... it is difficult for me to see how there can be a trespass
upon an incorporeal hereditament." 25 Since the mineral owners were not parties there is no discussion of damages, even
for innocent trespassing. The opinion should provide, how24
25

135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943).
Id. at 310.
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ever, a guide to Oklahoma's viewpoint should damages be
sought in a suit directly related to the problem under discussion.
Mississippi first contributed authority in 1949 in General
Geophysical Co. v. Brown. 6 The facts in this case show a
different facet of geophysical trespassing decisions. The plaintiff, landowner, granted the defendant permission to enter
for purposes of drilling (testing), but with the stipulation
that such testing would not be made within a given area near
the plaintiff's house and water well. Subsequently, the defendant violated this proviso and destruction of the plaintiff's
well resulted from such activity. The jury found that the
defendant had willfully violated instructions, making him a
trespasser ab initio. This verdict was affirmed on appeal, the
court stating that even the absence of any negligence did not
prevent recovery by the plaintiff. As a measure of damages
the court took the difference between the value of the farm
before the testing and after the injury to the well occured.
This is called the "before and after rule as to value." This
case could easily be placed within the "Bad Faith Trespasser"
category, but for the original valid entry on plaintiff's land.
The latest Texas case on this subject is Wilson v. Texas
Co." Mrs. Wilson, the plaintiff, sought damages for injury to
the surface of her property, and for a trespass to her right to
grant exploratory permits for the property. She was denied
recovery for injury to the surface because her evidence failed
to show the amount of damage inflicted by the defendant's
geophysical operations. She was denied recovery for trespass
to her right to grant exploratory permits, because at the time
that the defendant's operations were carried out, she had
already leased the land to two other oil companies, granting
them the exclusive right to prospect and explore the property.
26

205 Miss. 189, 38 So.2d 703 (1949).

27

237 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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The court held, that in light of these existing leases, she no
longer had any right to grant or sell exploratory permits.
The latest Louisiana case relating to geophysical activities
is Picou v. Foks Oil Co.2" Picou, plaintiff landowner, sued the
oil company and its employees for unlawful invasion of her
property to conduct geophysical explorations. A good faith
trespass was spelled out, however, because the plaintiff's
husband had granted permission to enter the tract. The plaintiff claimed damages for injury to trees; for illegal entry; for
information obtained and deterioration of leasing value because of dissemination of information wrongfully secured.
The defendant denied securing or disseminating any data,
but did admit damaging the trees. The court found that defendant had authority to enter and had exercised it in a lawful
manner and furthermore had obtained no information whatsoever and so could not have disseminated any. However, in
its discretion under statute the court awarded $100.00 damages for the trees cut down. One writer in commenting on this
case observed: 2 "It is interesting to note the opinion indicates that if the trespass is in good faith and unintentional,
the same rule applies as where the entry is authorized."
Negligence
A discussion within this category may be brief, for the
usual general rules of negligence govern. Exemplary cases
include Tupper v. Continental Oil Co.,3" a Louisiana case
decided in a United States District Court in 1947. In this case
the plaintiff's mausoleum was damaged by explosive testing.
Judgment was given for $750.00 as costs of repair plus
$1,000.00 for the structure which could not be repaired. This
case stands for the proposition that damages which are proxi28

222 La. 1008, 64 So.2d 434 (1953). Reported and discussed in 2 O

REPORTEP 525 (1953).
29 2On AND GAs REPRTER 525, 531 (1953).

30

73 F. Supp. 4 (D.C. La. 1947).
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mately caused by geophysical activities will be assessed the
responsible parties.
In a recent Mississippi case, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
McCollum,3 1 the defendant set off charges of explosives for
seismographic tests on the plaintiff's lands, allegedly destroying plaintiff's water well. Entry upon the land was with permission. The defendant was adjudged liable, the court holding
that the evidence was sufficient to justify the jury's findings
that the dynamite explosion was the proximate cause of the
damage to the plaintiff's well. However, proximate cause was
not sufficiently spelled out by the Mississippi complainant in
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Pittman," where the plaintiff,
Pittman, sued Humble for damages to his water well allegedly
caused by the defendant's explosions of dynamite 900 feet
from the well.
Explosives discharged on adjoining land caused damage to
the plaintiff's water wells in Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. v.
Lambert,3 a 1949 Texas decision. The court said the plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur charge was inadequate and the burden
was his to show negligence and the standard of care required
of the defendant.
Specific and detailed cases seeking damage for negligence
in geophysical tests are rather rare, but it would appear from
the above cases that the same standards of care, proximate
cause, necessary evidence, etc., as would be found in the
ordinary negligence case, have governed.
Lease Interpretation
Exclusiveness of reservations or grants in oil and gas leases
is the problem of this phase of our discussion. Shell Petroleum
Corp. v. Puckett,34 a 1930 Texas opinion, typifies the prob31

211 Miss. 166, 51 So.2d 217 (1951).

32

210 Miss. 314, 49 So.2d 408 (1950).

33
34

222 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
29 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
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.63

lem. In this case the outcome hinged on an interpretation
of the granting clause of the lease in which the words "mining
and operating for oil and gas" were employed. Obviously the
wording was general in nature, not mentioning the grant of
an exclusive right to prospect for or to conduct geophysical
explorations.
An unusual factual situation was presented. Puckett and
others had leased the property in question. Subsequently the
lessees gave one Skinner "an option to purchase all or any of
the leases." Shell acquired the option from Skinner. Before
exercising the right Shell decided to do some geophysical work
on the lands under option. The landowner, lessor, gave his
permission, but after unencouraging results Shell did not take
up its option.
Puckett and others were damaged by the activities of Shell
and sued for interference with an exclusive right to explore.
It was held the lessee had no right to sue and that the
defendant's use of the seismograph' did not deprive the plaintiff of the use of the land. The court reasoned that as the
plaintiff did not have an exclusive right under the terms of
the lease; the landowner lessor still had the same right, and
could accord such a privilege to a third party.
This seems to delimit the scope of the lease, but, it is submitted, such a concept should not be given cognizance in the
absence of an express reservation (running in lessor's favor)
in the lease.
Here the court held that if there were any injury to the
use of the land the right to recover damages rested with the
owner of the land. Of course, the plaintiff's lease gave no
possessory interest in the surface and therefore could not be
the basis for an action in trespass. Nonetheless, the defendant
has obtained an unjust benefit from his acts, even if they are
not deemed wrongful. He has obtained valuable information
relative to geological formations, aiding him in a decision of
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whether or not to buy other leases in the area and more
important, whether to buy the lease for which he had an
option.
Exclusiveness of leasing provisos was also discussed in the
case of Wilson v. Texas Company. Shell Petroleum Corp. v.
Puckett may be distinguished from the Wilson case by noting
that the earlier Puckett lease did not clearly spell out an
exclusiveness of exploration as the majority of the present
leases do. The problem may now be avoided by the insertion
of the following words in the granting clause of an oil and
gas lease: ".

.

. hereby grants, leases and lets exclusively to

the lessee for the purpose of investigating, exploring, prospecting. . . ." In fact, very recent leases leave nothing to the

vagaries of interpretation being even more detailed.35 They
rightly include the principles for paying the lessor additional
sums for injury to the surface resulting from seismographic
operations.
An oil and gas lessee obtained an injunction against a
surface (grazing) lessee, whose lease was subsequent in time
to the oil and gas lease of the complainant, in the 1944 Texas
case of Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. v. Wimberly." The plaintiff had a dominant tenement with the right of ingress and
egress as an appurtenant easement and a servitude on the
land. The right to explore was considered an incident of
mineral ownership. The plaintiff had no title to the surface,
but he sued to enjoin interference with servitude and the
court held his action proper and appropriate. Does not this
opinion vitiate the effectiveness of Shell Petroleum Corp. v.
Puckett?

Close scrutiny was given the exclusiveness of the granting
clause of an oil and gas lease in the 1950 Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals case of Yates v. Gulf Oil Corp.,"7 which arose in
36

7 SUMMERS ON OI AND GAS, § 1235, (Supp. 1952).
181 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).

37

182 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1950).

35
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Texas. The plaintiffs, oil and gas lessees, sought to restrain
defendants, tenants-in-common and occupants of the land
involved, from interfering with the plaintiff's agents who
were engaged in seismographic testing. The defendants, Yates
and his wife, insisted that the intention of the parties in
making the lease in 1924 should control. Geophysical operations, not having been heard of at that time, could not be
inferred in the granting clause, and no mention of "exploration" had been made in the lease. Payment for the privilege
was necessary according to the defendants. The court upheld
the plaintiff's contention, basing its decision on the ground
of "implied right", i.e., the right to use so much of the surface
'as necessary to enforce and enjoy the mineral estate. The
insertion of the specific words of grant, suggested above,
would have precluded the necessity for trying the instant
case. Again, this appears to be another decision which runs
contra to Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Puckett, but today such a
right would be implied and/or included within the actual
words of the oil and gas lease.
Summary
Regardless of the subdivision within which the geophysical
case may fall it is apparent that recovery may usually be had
for one or both of the following:
1. Shot hole value, actual surface or property damage
-

based on the local valuation.

2. Exploring permit - adjusted to the area's prevailing
price.
Market value recovery for loss of mineral rights because of
dissemination of harmful information diminishing speculative
values may be awarded, provided sufficient evidence of such
loss is adduced. Louisiana grants this recovery but insists that
only compensatory damages be awarded.
The value reaped by the wrongdoer is still a rare criterion
for damages, though it has been employed and certainly
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appears to be a proper grant and effective deterrent. As noted
above, the evaluation for such an award poses a real problem
for any court that decides to employ this means as a yardstick.
To reiterate, every lease should have a specific and exclusive grant of exploratory rights, eliminating any ambiguity
and uncertainty. To ensure his recovery by one of the value
criteria the plaintiff, where he is suing for wrongful entry and
dissemination of damaging information, should present clear
and convincing evidence of the shot hole value in the community, the actual physical damage suffered to realty and
personalty, and the market value of his right to lease prior to
and after the entry. Geophysical operators, in order to protect
themselves from either civil or criminal action, should secure
the written approval of both surface and mineral owners, and
state administrative officials where there are applicable
statutes.
Henry M. Shine, Jr.*
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